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TOURO LAW REVIEW
Housing Judges was covered by the New York State
Constitution.26 Therefore, because the section on appointment
power in the New York Civil Court Act conflicts with the New
York Constitution, the constitutional amendment prevails. 27
All of the aforementioned common law steps in logic indicate
that the Chief Administrator has the power to appoint Housing
Judges. Under the New York State Constitution this power is
derived from the Chief Judge and is virtually without limit in this
area. Furthermore, due to the supremacy of the New York State
Constitution over New York statutes, the proper reading of the
New York Civil Court Act and the amendments thereto require




(decided March 17, 1994)
The issue decided on appeal was whether the trial court
exceeded its authority by amending a criminal indictment to
include a count that had been properly designated by the grand
jury but left out of the original indictment as a result of a clerical
error.29 The New York Court of Appeals held that such a
measure was not within the constitutional parameters of the trial
court, as such alteration in the indictment was an impermissible
change of substance, not in form.30
The case on appeal was a consolidation of two separate
proceedings with the same legal issue. 31 In both cases, the
26. Met Council, Inc., 84 N.Y.2d at 335, 642 N.E.2d at 1077, 618
N.Y.S.2d at 621.
27. Durante v. Evans, 94 A.D.2d 141, 144, 464 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (3d
Dep't 1983) ("[The constitutional amendments abrogate the existing statute."),
aff'd, 62 N.Y.2d 719, 465 N.E.2d 367, 476 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1984)).
28. 83 N.Y.2d 269, 631 N.E.2d 570, 609 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1994).
29. Id. at 272, 631 N.E.2d at 570-71, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 564-65.
30. Id. at 276, 631 N.E.2d at 573, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
31. Id. at 272, 631 N.E.2d at 570, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 564-65.
1014 [Vol 11
1
et al.: Power of Courts
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
POWER OF COURTS
defendants were charged with a series of serious criminal
offenses. 32 The prosecution moved to amend the original
indictment to include an additional count that had allegedly been
left out by an inadvertent clerical oversight. 33 Upon review of the
motion, both trial court judges granted the revision to the
indictment. Subsequently, both defendants were convicted on the
new count. 34 The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed
both decisions, holding that there was no error in allowing for
the modification of the indictment.35 The defendants then sought
redress from the New York Court of Appeals on the grounds that
they were improperly tried on the charge not included in their
original indictment.36
The court began its analysis of the appeal by examining the
history of the state constitutional guarantee that individuals be
indicted by a grand jury before being tried for an infamous
crime. 37 The court cited to People v. Iannone,38 which held that
"[t]he requirement of indictment by Grand Jury is intended to
prevent the people of this State from potentially oppressive
excesses by the agents of the government in the exercise of the
prosecutorial authority vested in the State." 39 The court also
noted that in Sinonson v. Cahn4O it was stated that the issue is
not one of "'policy, expediency or convenience' - as a district
32. Id. at 272-73, 631 N.E.2d at 571, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 565. In Perez, the
defendant was charged with attempted murder, reckless endangerment and two
counts of attempted assault. Id. In Vasquez, the defendant was charged with
intentional murder and four additional counts. Id.
33. Id. In Perez, the People moved to amend the indictment to include one
count of criminal possession of a weapon based upon the same indictment. Id.
at 273, 631 N.E.2d at 571, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 565. In Vasquez, the People
moved to amend the indictment to include a charge of felony murder based
upon the same indictment. Id.
34. Id.
35. People v. Perez, 191 A.D.2d 285, 595 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1st Dep't 1993);
People v. Vasquez, 189 A.D.2d 578, 592 N.Y.S.2d 34 (lst Dep't 1993).
36. Perez, 83 N.Y.2d at 275, 631 N.E.2d at 572, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
37. Id. at 273, 631 N.E.2d at 571, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
38. 45 N.Y.2d 589, 384 N.E.2d 656, 412 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1978).
39. Id. at 594, 384 N.E.2d at 660, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
40. 27 N.Y.2d 1, 261 N.E.2d 246, 313 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1970).
1995] 1015
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 11 [2020], No. 3, Art. 50
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/50
TOURO LAWREVIEW
attorney or judges may see it - 'but with public fundamental
rights fixed by the Constitution.'
41
Accordingly, the court in Perez established that "[a]t common
law, the significance of an indictment was so great that trial
courts lacked the authority to amend it in any way." 42 Evidence
of the stringent nature of this rule is found in People v.
Jackson,43 where it was noted that "[indeed, prior to the
adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1881 by the
Legislature, indictments could not be amended and were
commonly dismissed on purely technical grounds.' 44
In an effort to stem the tide of criminal dismissals based upon
"technicalities", the rigidity of the common law rule was
amended in limited degree with the passage of section 293 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure to permit "a court to vary an
indictment in matters relating to times, names or descriptions,
provided that the accused was not prejudiced." 45
The alteration in the rule, however, was quite restrictive. 46 The
basic guiding principle of the cases that followed the enactment
of the new statute was clearly enunciated in People v. Geyer.47 In
Geyer, the court found that "[it] was not the purpose of the
legislature to attempt to authorize the trial court by amendment to
change the substantial elements and nature of the crime charged
and in effect substitute a new indictment in the place of the one
found by the grand jury. " 48 For instance, in People v. Van
Every,49 a clerical error in the indictment mistakenly charged the
defendant with a crime allegedly committed some eight months
41. Id. at 3, 261 N.E.2d at 247, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 99 (quoting People ex
rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 317-18, 164 N.E. 111, 111 (1928).
42. Perez, 83 N.Y.2d at 273, 631 N.E.2d at 571, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
43. 153 Misc. 2d 270, 582 N.Y.S.2d 336 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1991).
44. Id. at 271, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
45. Perez, 83 N.Y.2d at 273, 631 N.E.2d at 571, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
46. Id. at 274, 631 N.E.2d at 571-72, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 565-66.
47. 196 N.Y. 364, 90 N.E. 48 (1909).
48. Id. at 367, 90 N.E. at 49.
49. 222 N.Y. 74, 118 N.E. 244 (1917).
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after the finding of the indictment. 50 Although this may have
obviously been a simple clerical oversight, the court nonetheless
found the error to be one of substance and not of form. 51
Therefore, the court discharged the defendant. 52 Furthermore, in
People v. Ercole,53 the court barred the use of an additional
alleged theory of why or how the defendant committed the
purported crime that was not stated in the original indictment,
even though the actual counts of the indictment remained
unchanged. 54 Moreover, in People v. Miles,55 the court found
that the indictment provision was not waiveable, holding that a
new count could not be added to an indictment even with the
consent of the defendant through their attorney. 56
The court then noted that although the current Criminal
Procedure Law section 200.70 superseded section 293 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure with different language, "the
drafters stated that no substantive change in the law was
intended." 57 The court then stated that it was very significant that
subdivision, two of the new provision specifically "prohibits
amendment of an indictment for the purpose of curing
a... failure thereof to charge or state an offense." 58 It was the
defendants' position that such express language in the statute
should bar any amendment that adds an offense to the
indictment. 59 Conversely, the state argued that the statute was
"specifically designed to avoid dismissals premised solely on
technical errors and assert[ed] that to require dismissal here
50. Id. at 78, 118 N.E. at 245. The grand jury handed down an indictment
on February 8, 1915 charging the defendant with a crime which supposedly
occurred on October 17, 1915. Id. at 76, 118 N.E. at 245.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 79, 118 N.E. at 245.
53. 308 N.Y. 425, 126 N.E.2d 543 (1955).
54. Id. at 439, 126 N.E.2d at 550.
55. 289 N.Y. 360, 45 N.E.2d 910 (1942).
56. Id. at 363-64, 45 N.E.2d at 912.
57. Perez, 83 N.Y.2d at 274, 631 N.E.2d at 572, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
58. Id. at 274-75, 631 N.E.2d at 572, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
59. Id. at 275, 631 N.E.2d at 572, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
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where the errors were patently technical - clerical mistakes -
would be contrary to the intent of the statute." 6
0
The court in reaching its conclusion established that "the
subdivision makes clear that only certain kinds of errors - even if
they effect no change in the prosecution's theory - may be subject
to amendment: those 'relating to matters of form, time, place,
names of persons and the like."' 61 The court further reasoned
that "[w]hatever flexibility is built into the open-ended term 'and
the like', it certainly does not extend the category so far as to
allow the addition of an entirely new count." 62 The court then
held that "the amendment in each of these cases was designed to
cure a failure to charge or state an offense and is not authorized
by CPL section 200.70. Such an amendment is a change in
substance, not in form." 63 The court noted that such "omission
must be cured by superseding indictment or re-presentment."
64
Therefore, in both cases the court vacated the conviction of the
amended criminal charge and dismissed the defendants on that
count of the indictment. 65
The federal courts take a very similar, if not identical,
approach to the issue as the New York Court of Appeals. The
longstanding precedent on the issue in the federal jurisdiction was
established by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Bain.66 In Bain,
the Court held that "no person should be called to answer any
capital or otherwise infamous crime, except upon an indictment
or presentment of a grand jury, in the full sense of its necessity
and of its value." 67 The Court reasoned that:
60. Id.




65. Id. at 276-77, 631 N.E.2d at 573, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
66. 121 U.S. 1 (1886).
67. Id. at 12. See United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding that amendments of substance must be sent back to the grand jury);
United States v. Muelbl, 739 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Young, 730 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1984).
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If it lies within the province of the court to change the charging
part of an indictment to suit its own notions of what it ought to
have been, or what the grand jury would probably have made it
if their attention had been called to suggested changes, the great
importance which the common law attaches to an indictment by a
grand jury... may be frittered away until its value is almost
destroyed. 68
Nearly three quarters of a century later, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the Bain decision. In Sitrone v. United States,6 9 the
Court held that "[tihe Bain case, which has never been
disapproved, stands for the rule that a court cannot permit a
defendant to be tried on charges that are not made in the
indictment against him." 70 The Court explained the rule to be
"that after an indictment has been returned its charges may not be
broadened through amendment except by the grand jury itself."
7 1
The rigidity of this rule, however, has given way in a limited
degree to allow some flexibility in recent times. For instance, in
United States v. Kegler,72 the court held that:
The modem rule is that an indictment may be amended by the
court, provided that the amendment is not substantial, it is
sufficiently definite and certain, the accused is not taken by
surprise, and any evidence the defendant had before the
amendment would be equally available to him after the
amendment. 73
Furthermore, the court noted that "the settled rule in federal
courts prohibits substantive amendments, but permits changes in
indictments that are merely 'a matter of form' or which correct
68. Bain, 121 U.S. at 10.
69. 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
70. Id. at 217. See United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120 (1st Cir. 1981)
(holding that an indictment cannot be amended unless it is a matter of form).
71. Id. at 215-16. See United States v. Gonzalez, 661 F.2d 488 (5th Cir.
1981) (holding that charges may not be broadened except by the grand jury).
72. 724 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
73. Id. at 195.
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insignificant clerical errors." 74 This interpretation is in complete
accord with the status of New York law.
The development of the issue of amending an indictment by a
grand jury has been the same in both the federal and New York
jurisdictions. The common law principle was very strict, in that
amendments were not at all permitted. In modem times, the rule
has evolved to allow for some modification of an indictment, but
only to the extent that such alteration relates only to the most




(decided December 9, 1994)
In Williams, the constitutional issue raised was whether the
supreme court could retain jurisdiction over a suppression motion
stemming from a weapons charge, involving a juvenile, after it
had been severed from other charges. 76 After examining article
VI, sections 7(a) and (b) of the New York State Constitution,77
74. Id. at 194. See United States v. Field, 875 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1989)
(quoting United States v. Field, 659 F.2d 163, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating
that amendments were permitted regarding matters of form); United States v.
Nabors, 762 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1985) (eliminating mere surplusage is
allowable).
75. 1994 WL 744862, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Dec. 9, 1994). This
case, pending publication, will be reported at 622 N.Y.S.2d 654.
76. Id. at *2. The court's decision to sever the weapons counts from the
robbery counts was based on the fact that "[t]he evidence of one offense would
not have been admissible at the trial of the other, since there was no indication
that the same weapon was involved." Id. at *3.
77. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 7. Article VI, section 7 provides:
a. The supreme court shall have general original jurisdiction in law and
equity and the appellate jurisdiction herein provided. In the city of New
York, it shall have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes prosecuted by
indictment, provided, however, that the legislature may grant to the
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